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This paper investigates one causal mechanism that may explain why female judges on the 
federal appellate courts are more likely than men to side with plaintiffs in sex 
discrimination cases. To test whether personal experiences with inequality are related to 
empathetic responses to the claims of female plaintiffs, we focus on the first wave of 
female judges, who attended law school during a time of severe gender inequality. We 
find that female judges are more likely than their male colleagues to support plaintiffs in 
sex discrimination cases, but that this difference is seen only in judges who graduated 
law school between 1954 and 1975 and disappears when more recent law school cohorts 
of men and women judges are compared.  These results suggest that the effect of gender 
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Trailblazers and Those That Followed: 
Personal Experiences, Gender, and Judicial Empathy 
 
You know, the young women today can't possibly…understand the pressures of being 
first. . . Nothing was good enough, and it took me an awful lot of years to realize how 
good many of the women really were in relationship to the men's talents. I mean, when I 
think of it, men that were hundreds of places below us in class were getting great jobs 
and there were no jobs for us. 
- Judge Ilana Rovner1  
 
Every time I wanted to do something, I had to invent a way to do it because there was no 
path for me. 
- Judge Shirley Hufstedler2 
 
When U.S. Courts of Appeals’ judges Ilana Rovner and Shirley Hufstedler 
graduated from law school in 1966 and 1949, respectively, nationwide, women 
comprised less than 5 percent of all law students (www.americanbar.org).  In contrast, in 
2011, women made up 46 percent of all students enrolled in law school. These judges’ 
comments about the obstacles they faced as trailblazers when entering the legal 
profession are quite similar to the recollections of former U.S. Supreme Court justices 
Sandra Day O’Connor and Ruth Bader Ginsburg about overtly discriminatory treatment 
in law school and the legal profession in the 1950s and 60s (Ginsburg & O’Connor 2010).  
Oral histories of the first women appointed to the lower federal judiciary repeatedly touch 
                                                        
1Women Trailblazers in the Law Project Oral Histories, Box 8, Manuscript Division, 
Library of Congress, Washington, DC. Transcript of oral history of Ilana Diamond 
Rovner, Karen A. Clanton interviewer. Dates of interviews: August 20, 28, September 28, 
November 8, 2007, pp. 20-21.  
2Diversifying the Judiciary, An Oral History of Women Federal Judges, Federal Judicial 
Center. Transcript of interview with Shirley Hufstedler, Sarah Wilson interviewer. Date 
of interview: March 10, 1995, p. 11. 
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upon the themes of blatant discrimination against women by law professors, fellow law 
students, and employers. When this trailblazer generation of female judges joined 
formerly all-male courts, many of them also came face-to-face with exclusionary 
traditions and practices in their new circuits (Haire & Moyer 2015).  For instance, when 
Florence Allen joined the Sixth Circuit as the first woman, she dined alone at lunchtime 
because her male colleagues frequently lunched at private clubs that did not admit 
women.3  Given how widespread discriminatory treatment was for early female 
appointees, did their personal experiences with discrimination affect how these judges 
confronted the issue of sex discrimination in their cases? 
Recent research on the U.S. Courts of Appeals has established that female judges 
are more likely than men to side with plaintiffs in sex discrimination cases (Boyd et al. 
2010; Peresie 2005) and other types of employment discrimination cases (Songer et al. 
1994; Moyer & Tankersley 2012).4  Scholars have speculated that women’s personal 
experiences with sex discrimination (and men’s lack of such experiences) could be 
driving this effect (Martin et al. 2002).  For instance, in a survey of Carter’s female 
appointees, many of whom attended law schools during periods marked by stark gender 
inequality, 81% described some form of sex discrimination as the primary challenge 
                                                        
3 Women Trailblazers in the Law Project Oral Histories, Box 9, Manuscript Division, 
Library of Congress, Washington, DC, Transcript of oral history of Mary Murphy 
Schroeder, Patricia Lee Refo interviewer. Dates of interviews: August 30, September 9, 
October 13, 2006; January 3, 2007, p. 82. 
4 Similar findings in sex discrimination cases have been shown at the state supreme court 
level (Gryski et al. 1986).  
 4 
facing a woman or man in law (Martin 1990:  207).  How might these women judges’ 
personal experiences affect their perspective on cases dealing with sex discrimination? 
Building on research by others who have examined men’s and women’s attitudes toward 
gender equality, we test the premise that the propensity to support sex discrimination 
plaintiffs should be highest among the group of “trailblazer” women who entered the 
legal profession during a time when overt discrimination against women was severe and 
prevalent.  We posit that this increased likelihood to side with sex discrimination 
plaintiffs is not attributable merely to being a woman, per se, but rather about the 
experiences that shaped this particular class of women defined by when they attended law 
school. As such, our argument fits into a large body of work by sociologists that has 
focused on the formative experiences of generations and cohorts (Mannheim [1928] 
1952; Kertzer 1983; Schuman & Scott 1989).  
The linkage between traits, empathy, and experiences is an important one to 
understand because this connection has been emphasized by those involved in the 
selection of those who will sit on the federal bench.  When President Obama referenced 
the term “empathy” in his nomination of Sonia Sotomayor to the Supreme Court, it was 
in the context that an individual’s personal experiences would allow them to better 
understand the plight of those bringing their claims to court (Weisman 2009).  Indeed, 
recent scholarship has uncovered other ways that personal experiences can affect judging 
(e.g., Haire & Moyer 2015). For instance, one study found that conservative male judges 
became more supportive of plaintiffs in sex discrimination cases after having daughters, 
leading the authors to conclude that empathy could have a crosscutting effect with respect 
to ideology (Glynn & Sen 2015). 
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Below, we review the state of the literature on attitudes toward and perceptions of 
sex discrimination, and how this research might be applicable to the study of federal 
judges. We then set forth our theoretical account that links psychological research to 
explain how the personal experiences of judges lead them to draw different inferences 
from case fact patterns involving claims of sex discrimination.  We test our hypotheses 
using a sample of sex discrimination cases from the U.S. Courts of Appeals (1995-2008) 
and find evidence that the earliest wave of female judges who confronted overt 
discrimination in law school and the legal profession were more likely to side with 
plaintiffs in cases of sex discrimination.  We conclude by examining the implications of 
our finding for accounts of judging more generally and for the judicial selection process. 
 
Attitudes about gender inequality and discrimination 
To understand how a judge’s personal experiences could translate into greater 
judicial support for sex discrimination plaintiffs, we must first know something about 
men and women’s attitudes toward gender inequality and discrimination.  Overall, 
researchers are in agreement that, on most issues, attitudes about women in the workplace 
and roles within the family have liberalized over time (Carter et al. 2009; Bolzendahl & 
Myers 2004; Simon & Landis 1989).  For instance, surveys from the early 1970s showed 
that a majority of all respondents rated the women’s movement unfavorably, but that by 
1974, a majority rated the movement favorably (Huddy et al. 2000).5  Researchers 
                                                        
5 However, question wording can affect the magnitude of these results.  For instance, the 
term “feminist” tends to elicit lower levels of support compared to the term “women’s 
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attribute this liberalization to a combination of individual attitude change and population 
replacement (Brewster & Padavic 2000; Ciabattari 2001).  In addition to period effects, 
the literature also reports small or no differences at all in gender role beliefs when men 
and women are compared over time (Bolzendahl & Myers 2004; Crosby 1982).6 
However, there is some indication that men and women in the mass public differ 
in their perceptions of sex discrimination specifically.  In a comparison of surveys from 
1975 to 1987, Simon & Landis (1989) report that the percentage of female respondents 
who perceived discrimination against women increased by ten points, while the 
percentage of men with this view actually dropped slightly.7  In more recent surveys, 
women express significantly higher levels of support for gender-based affirmative action 
than men, but attitudes about the existence of gender discrimination are also an important 
                                                                                                                                                                     
movement” (Huddy et al. 2000; Buschman & Lenart 1996), although support for both 
terms is highly correlated (Rhodebeck 1996).   
6 Commonly used questions that tap into gender role beliefs ask about the desirability of 
women working outside the home, the desirability of women participating in politics, and 
whether children are negatively affected when their mothers work outside the home. 
7 A related debate in the literature discusses whether both men and women can be 
feminists (Klein 1984; Rhodebeck 1996). We do not take a position on whether a judge 
must be a feminist, per se, in order to express high levels of support for sex 
discrimination plaintiffs; for one thing, the existing data do not provide us with any 
reliable information about whether judges consider themselves to be feminist or 
supportive of feminism more generally, so we are unable to test for any effect of such 
identification.  
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predictor (Kane & Whipkey 2009).  Brewster & Padavic (2000) compare 1977 and 1996 
GSS data, finding that men are significantly more conservative than women in their 
attitudes about working women in both time periods, and also that men’s attitudes have 
been slower to change than women’s (despite a liberalizing trend over time).      
Employed women in particular appear to be more aware of sex discrimination 
than other groups (Negowetti 2014; Simon & Landis 1989).  Surveys of lawyers (Epstein 
2004; Coontz 1995) and doctors (Carr et al. 2000) also reveal this difference in awareness 
of gender bias as well, with women seeing both discrimination and sexual harassment in 
employment contexts more often than men.   
Experimental research by social psychologists also supports the general 
conclusion from survey data that women perceive sex discrimination and sexual 
harassment more often than men (O’Connor et al. 2004; Rotundo, Nguyen, & Sackett 
2001; Wiener et al. 1995; Wiener et al. 1997). One study speculates that “women are 
more likely to find evidence of harassment because they are more sensitive to sexual 
misconduct than are men” (Wiener at al. 2004:  62).   
In assessing the applicability of these strands of research to understanding judicial 
decision making processes, research that uses experimental methods or asks subjects to 
evaluate vignettes is most similar to the judicial setting, where judges carefully consider 
the detailed facts of a case in making their ruling.  Judges are confronted not with 
discrimination in the abstract (as a question on a survey), but with “the empirical realities 
of women's lives” (MacKinnon 2002: 832), which they must evaluate in light of 
controlling legal doctrines.   For instance, a plaintiff claiming disparate treatment under 
Title VII must show that “but for” her sex, she would not have been subject to an adverse 
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employment action.  O’Connor et al. (2004: 91) point out that being able to “put oneself 
in the target’s shoes will affect the extent to which one believes the target’s story about 
the complex facts at issue.”   
Judges in discrimination cases must be able to put themselves in the “shoes” of 
both the plaintiff and the defendant because of legal doctrines that structure their decision 
making.  For example, in cases of employment discrimination brought under Title VII, 
judges employ shifting burdens analyses in disparate treatment claims.  As another 
illustration, in a sexual harassment case, a judge will evaluate whether a “reasonable 
person” would concur with the plaintiff’s assessment that she faced a hostile work 
environment.  A theoretical construct that relates to this process of understanding is the 
concept of empathy, which scholars have leveraged to explain why legal decision makers 
side with particular parties (Negowetti 2014; Glynn & Sen 2015).  In the next sections, 
we draw on this line of research to develop a framework for our analysis that connects 
empathy with gender and judging.  
 
Judging and empathy 
Plumm & Terrance (2009: 191) define empathy as “the ability of one person 
(observer) to take on the perspective of another (actor).” They go on to distinguish 
between trait empathy and situational empathy.  Trait empathy is triggered by a similarity 
between the observer and actor, such as gender or race; situational empathy occurs when 
imagining oneself in the situation of the actor.  The latter type of empathy can be induced 
in experimental manipulations where the subject is explicitly tasked with placing him or 
herself in the “shoes” of another person.  However, group membership (e.g., race or 
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gender), when salient, can mediate the effects of situational empathy that might be 
induced in an experiment or in a case; for instance, white mock jurors who were induced 
to feel empathy toward black or white criminal defendants still routinely “sentenced” the 
black defendants more harshly than their white counterparts (Johnson et al. 2002).  Other 
research on the role of empathy in juror decision making has found that female mock 
jurors are much more likely to side with battered women who kill, regardless of 
empathetic induction strategies (Plumm & Terrance 2009).  While men who were 
induced to feel more empathy for the battered woman in this study did express more 
positive views of the victim than men not in the empathy induction condition, overall 
men were still less supportive of the defendant than women were. Finally, compared to 
men, female mock jurors showed higher levels of empathy toward a rape victim in a 
mock trial, particularly those mock jurors who had personally experienced rape (Dietz et 
al. 1982).   
These studies suggest the utility of drawing an analogy between empathetic 
induction as presented in experimental research (“situational empathy”) and decision 
making that requires a judge to understand the actions of a plaintiff and defendant in a 
case alleging sex discrimination.  (Recall that situation empathy refers to the ability to 
imagine oneself in another person’s situation.)  As the studies above indicate, situational 
empathy may vary depending on one’s ability to observe a similarity between oneself and 
the other person (“trait empathy”).  In the context of sex discrimination, trait empathy 
suggests that women should identify with an alleged victim who was also a woman.  
Empirical findings also support this approach, pointing to persistent differences between 
men and women’s understanding of sex discrimination that is linked to the degree to 
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which each group can relate to claims of sex discrimination.  We argue, however, that it 
is not simply a trait that affects the type of empathetic response but how well members of 
that group (i.e., women) can relate to the position taken by the plaintiff.  Women who 
experienced severe, first-hand discrimination will be particularly sensitive to claims of 
sex discrimination alleged by other women.  Our argument considers next how these 
empirical findings can be extrapolated to help understand the behavior of federal judges 
in cases of discrimination.   
 
Judge gender and discrimination 
 Existing surveys provide support for the contention that women and men on the 
federal bench will vary in their views about the prevalence, causes, and consequences of 
gender inequality in society. One study, conducted by Elaine Martin, surveyed President 
Carter’s judicial appointees to the lower federal courts (30 women and 92 men).  
Responses to several questions point to major differences between men and women in 
areas relevant to sex discrimination.  Fifty-five percent of all women reported “frequently” 
experiencing conflicts between career and family when their children were younger, 
compared with only 28 percent of male respondents.  This cohort of female appointees 
also expressed higher levels of support for the women’s movement (86 percent) relative 
to the male appointees (56 percent). Perhaps the most striking difference came in 
response to a question about one’s major problems as a woman or man in the law.  
Female judges overwhelmingly (81 percent) made explicit reference to experiencing 
some form of sex discrimination, like “bias against women” or the “belief that a woman’s 
place is in the home” (Martin 1990: 207). In contrast, male respondents referenced 
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professional challenges or time management challenges as a major problem in the law 
(Martin 1990: 207). Martin concludes, “Women judges in this study, perhaps as a 
consequence of these personal experiences, evidence greater attitudinal feminism than 
men” (1990: 208).  
 A second study (P. Martin et al. 2002) draws from a 1988 survey on gender bias 
conducted by the Florida Supreme Court Task Force.  (The respondents included Florida 
attorneys and judges of both sexes.)  The authors argue that women’s greater experiences 
with gender bias will sensitize women, more than men, to these issues (667).  Consistent 
with these expectations, women lawyers and judges reported observing more gender 
harassment and sexual harassment than their male counterparts. Interestingly, male 
judges reported the fewest observations of gender bias of any group (even compared with 
male attorneys).  The analysis also compared men and women’s responses in several 
areas that tapped into a feminist consciousness:  rape myths, maintaining the traditional 
division of labor in the home (“separate spheres”), divorce property rights, stereotypes of 
women, and domestic violence.8  Among judges, women expressed significantly more 
feminist answers than men in every area except for “separate spheres” (in which there 
was no significant differences between the sexes).  Martin et al. (2002) conclude that, 
                                                        
8 Martin et al. follow Klein (1984) in defining feminist consciousness as (1) the belief 
that women and girls are systematically discriminated against, (2) the belief that this 
dynamic is wrong, and (3) and the belief that collective action is necessary to correct this 
wrong.  However, they differ from Klein insofar as they posit that both men and women 
can have feminist consciousness (Martin et al. 2002: 671).  
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overall, there is a strong relationship between observations and feminist consciousness 
for the women in the survey, but not for the men.    
 Public statements by female judges themselves support our central argument that 
many experienced sex discrimination and that such experiences informed their work on 
the bench. As part of the American Bar Association oral history project “Women 
Trailblazers in the Law,” many of the first wave of female appellate judges were 
interviewed about their experiences in law school and the legal profession.  While these 
interviews represent only anecdotes as opposed to systematic data, the comments within 
do shed some light on the challenges faced by women who were among the first to be 
appointed to the federal appellate bench.     
 First, in terms of experiences in law school, many of these judges attended law 
schools in which the number of women in their class was in single digits.  Both Shirley 
Hufstedler (a Johnson appointee) and Cynthia Hall (a Reagan appointee) discussed 
separately in their oral histories that they were one of only two women in their Stanford 
law school classes.  Ruth Bader Ginsburg (JD 1959) told The New York Times that the 
low number of women often meant additional scrutiny and pressure:  “[M]ost sections 
had just 2 women, and you felt that every eye was on you. Every time you went to answer 
a question, you were answering for your entire sex…You were different and the object of 
curiosity” (Bazelon 2009).9  Hall attended law school at a time when many veterans were 
using the GI Bill to earn law degrees and observed that her fellow students were critical 
                                                        
9Ginsburg served on the D.C. Circuit prior to her appointment to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
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of her for “taking a good man's place.”10  Law faculty could also be hostile toward the 
few female students in their classes.  For instance, Stephanie Seymour (JD 1965) 
describes how both professors and male classmates were “overt and obvious” in 
expressing their opinion that “I didn’t belong there simply because I was female.”11  Two 
female judges (Patricia Wald and Cynthia Hall) who attended different law schools, Yale 
and Stanford, both recalled that law professors liked to call on women more often than 
men when discussing rape cases (Wald 1994, 980).12  
Once in the legal profession, many of these women encountered blatant sex 
discrimination from employers.  Judge Betty Fletcher (JD 1956) recalled that she was 
blindsided by the discrimination she experienced when she was looking for a job right 
after law school, describing the prejudice as hitting her “like a ton of bricks.”13  In their 
oral histories, both Mary Schroeder (JD 1965) and Carolyn King (JD 1962) discuss 
experiences with flagrant discrimination during their time in private practice.   When 
Schroeder learned she was pregnant, she was advised to keep her pregnancy a secret; 
                                                        
10Diversifying the Judiciary, An Oral History of Women Federal Judges, Federal Judicial 
Center, interview with Cynthia B. Hall, Sarah Wilson interviewer. Date of interview: 
March 10, 1995, p. 4 
11 Diversifying the Judiciary, transcript of oral history of Stephanie Seymour, pp. 52-53 
12 Diversifying the Judiciary, transcript of oral history of Cynthia Hall, p. 12. 
13 Women Trailblazers in the Law Project Oral Histories, Box 3, Manuscript Division, 
Library of Congress, Washington, DC, transcript of oral history of Betty Binns Fletcher, 
Kathleen J. Hopkins interviewer. Dates of interviews: January 10, February 22, April 17, 
2006, p. 6.  
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similarly, King was informed that she was denied promotion to partner because the other 
partners believed that she should be at home with her children.  A somewhat later 
appointee, Rosemary Barkett (JD 1970) told an interviewer that she frequently heard 
from other women lawyers that “they could not maintain their positions in the law firms 
and have children” and that she believed this was a wrong that needed to be remedied.14  
Some women also faced hostility when they became judges.  For instance, the 
first woman appointed to the U.S. Courts of Appeals, Florence Allen (JD 1914) was not 
welcomed to the Sixth Circuit by her new male colleagues.  Kenney (2013: 141) writes 
that the other judges “had in fact opposed her appointment.  Three judges failed to write a 
customary letter of congratulation.” Another colleague “was so distressed he reportedly 
took to his sickbed for two days following her appointment” (Ginsburg & Brill 1995: 
283). 
A few of these “trailblazer” judges have gone farther than simply cataloguing 
their experiences with discrimination and noted how their past has informed their actions 
as judges.  For instance, Judge Patricia Wald (JD 1951) writes, “a judge is the sum of her 
experiences and if she has suffered disadvantages or discrimination as a woman, she is 
apt to be sensitive to its subtle expressions” (2005: 989).  Similarly, when she was the 
only woman on the Ninth Circuit, Hufstedler (JD 1949) noted that many of her male 
colleagues “had a hard time seeing the world as it really is” in sex discrimination cases, 
                                                        
14 Women Trailblazers in the Law, transcript of oral history of Rosemary Barkett, pp. 
133-138. 
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and that she would tease them about things like “irrelevant” weight limitations on women 
for carrying packages.15 
To summarize, survey results reported in the literature demonstrate that women 
judges are generally more aware of gender bias and sex discrimination than men.  Oral 
histories and public statements by women in the first cohort of federal appellate judges 
document experiences with blatant sex discrimination in law school and the profession.  
And comments by two judges in particular suggest that their behavior in sex 
discrimination cases was influenced by their own experiences as and observations about 
women.  
 
Linking gendered experiences and judicial behavior 
As we alluded to in the introduction, there is a growing body of evidence in the 
U.S. Courts of Appeals literature showing that female judges are more likely to support 
the plaintiff in sex discrimination cases (Boyd et al. 2010; Peresie 2005), as well as in 
other types of employment discrimination cases (Songer et al. 1994).  Their presence 
alongside male judges on a panel is also associated with favorable outcomes for female 
plaintiffs in sexual harassment cases (Moyer & Tankersley 2012) and in causing male 
colleagues to support plaintiffs in sex discrimination cases (Boyd et al. 2010) and other 
employment discrimination cases (Farhang & Wawro 2004).  These scholars speculate 
that women’s greater sensitivity to gender bias because of their personal experiences may 
be driving the differences between men and women.  Our argument builds on this 
contention and suggests that first-hand experience with severe, pervasive discrimination 
                                                        
15 Diversifying the Federal Judiciary, transcript of oral history of Shirley Hufstedler, p. 23 
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was commonplace for the first wave of female judges because of the unique set of 
circumstances these women faced.   
 [Figure 1 about here] 
 The oral histories of the “trailblazer” women appointed to the federal bench 
describe a vastly different environment for those who attended law school in the 1950s, 
60s, and early 70s when compared to those who received their law degrees in later eras.  
To illustrate, Figure 1 displays the percentage of enrolled women in law school from 
1947 to 2011.  It is important to note that the numbers from the 1940s and 50s are 
suppressed in part because many law schools openly refused to admit women until the 
1960s (Mossman 2006).  As the judges’ comments from the previous section indicate, 
women who attended law school in earlier eras often felt isolated and under tremendous 
pressure because of their small numbers.  They also experienced harassment and outright 
hostility from male classmates and faculty.16  One such judge, Ruth Bader Ginsburg has 
recounted that during her time at Harvard Law School, the dean invited all the female 
students to his house for dinner, only to ask them why they were taking places that could 
have been occupied by deserving men (www.oyez.org).   
Another shared set of experiences among the earliest female judges is the 
employment environment that they faced.  Prior to the 1964 passage of Title VII, 
                                                        
16 In an overview of the literature, Kay & Gorman (2008) discuss how women law 
students in more recent time periods (1990s-2000s) continue to report experiencing 
gender-based bias from classmates and professors. Our contention is not that such 
behavior is confined to the trailblazer era, but rather that it has diminished in 
pervasiveness and degree over time.  
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employers could legally refuse to hire qualified women.  Because employers continued to 
engage in discriminatory practices into the 1970s (Epstein 1983), the passage of the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 provided additional enforcement powers to 
the federal government.  However, other measures, including the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act (1978), were needed to promote equal employment opportunities for 
women in the workplace.   
As summarized above, the passage of civil rights laws and societal expectations 
about working women shifted substantially over time.  But beyond effects that signify 
societal shifts, we argue that, for the first wave of female judges, their personal 
experiences with sex discrimination and gender-based hostility were qualitatively unique, 
even compared with the sexism experienced by women who became lawyers in later eras.  
In particular, their small numbers in law schools heightened their isolation and 
encouraged scrutiny of them in ways that men never experienced as part of their 
professional training.  We thus contend that the first “trailblazer” wave of female judges 
should have distinctive decision-making patterns that reflect these personal experiences 
with discrimination.17 However, as women’s representation in the law increased and the 
                                                        
17 As such, we draw from perspectives in sociology that contend that formative 
experiences can have “sticking” power and are carried forward, affecting attitudes later in 
life (Mannheim [1928] 1952; Schuman & Scott 1989). For instance, one study that 
examined collective memories of major events found that younger women were more 
likely to volunteer that the women’s movement was an “especially important” national 
event during their lifetime, but not older women or any men (Schuman & Scott 1989).   
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legal culture shifted to reflect this, differences between men and women judges in their 
responses to sex discrimination should diminish over time. 
 The empathy literature in social psychology reviewed above suggests the utility of 
drawing on this concept in building a theoretical account of judicial decision making.  In 
an analysis focused on race, Weinberg and Nielsen (2012) use an empathetic perspective 
to examine district court decisions on motions for summary judgment in civil rights cases.  
They argue that when evaluating whether a case should go forward at this stage, a trial 
judge’s decision depends largely on his or her perception of an employer’s actions 
against a plaintiff (2012: 323).  At the appellate level, circuit judges also may review 
whether the facts of the case (in the light most favorable to the appealing party) supported 
a summary judgment decision.  Appeals involving sex discrimination claims under 
McDonnell Douglas v. Green and Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine 
also require appellate judges to assess whether the district court committed reversible 
error in their assessment of whether the plaintiff showed, by a preponderance of evidence, 
that her employer discriminated against her.  As part of the analysis for Title VII 
disparate treatment claims, judges must assess the actions taken against the plaintiff and 
whether the defendant’s explanation for those actions are mere pretext.   
In this respect, all appellate judges are potentially induced by the very nature of 
their task to put themselves in the situation of the plaintiffs (i.e., situational empathy).  
However, we expect that there will be variation in their responses linked to whether the 
judge can relate personally to the plaintiff’s experiences or whether they are inclined to 
be more deferential to the defendant’s arguments.  Past experiences with sex 
discrimination should, in effect, prime those women who experienced severe 
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discrimination during their professionally formative years to be more responsive to 
female plaintiffs alleging discriminatory treatment because of their sex.  However, as 
experience with overt discrimination diminishes over time, so too should gender 
differences. Thus, we test the argument that it is a gendered experience with 
discrimination, rather than gender alone, which enhances the likelihood of a response in 
support of the plaintiff. 
 
Hypothesis 
 As described above, trailblazer women’s recollections of their time in law school 
and private practice indicate that many of their male classmates, male professors, and 
male colleagues did not respond favorably to the novelty of working with women as 
peers.  The intensity and overt nature of the discrimination they experienced should prime 
this group of women to be more receptive to claims of sex discrimination.  Thus, while 
men and women who attended law school at the same time are both part of the same law 
school cohort, we expect that their formative experiences during this stage of their legal 
career were fundamentally different with long term effects flowing from these 
experiences over the course of their judicial careers.  
Our review of public opinion research on attitudes toward working women 
indicates a clear, liberalizing trend over time (Ciabattari 2001; Brewster & Padavic 2000).  
One study of surveys about the desirability of married women working outside the home 
even concluded there were no significant differences between men and women after 1975 
(Simon & Landis 1989).   As such, we hypothesize that the trailblazer group of women 
will be more likely than men of the same generation to support the position of the 
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plaintiff in sex discrimination cases, but that differences between male and female judges 
will decrease in more recent law school cohorts. 
 
Data and Measures 
Our study draws from the dataset of sex discrimination cases in the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals used by Boyd et al. (2010) and originally compiled by Sunstein et al. (2006).  
Updated by Epstein et al. (2013), the cases extend from 1995 to 2008 and include both 
sex discrimination and sexual harassment claims (Sunstein et al. 2006:  159).  We 
supplemented these data by collecting additional biographical information from the 
Federal Judicial Center on a judge’s legal education, including the year in which he or 
she received his or her law degree.  Where a judge was listed as having multiple law 
degrees (i.e., J.D. and L.L.M), only the first degree was recorded.18  Table 1 lists all 
female judges appointed to the U.S. Courts of Appeals, denoting those who appear in the 
dataset along with their birth year, appointment cohort, and year they completed their law 
degree.  The median male judge in our sample was born in 1937 and completed their 
legal education in 1963, while the median female judge was born in 1944 and finished 
law school in 1971.   
[Table 1 about here] 
                                                        
18 For many of the older men in the dataset (and a few women), their law degree was 
actually a L.L.B., not a J.D., as was fairly common prior to the 1960s.    
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 The dependent variable in our analysis is the case outcome supported by a judge’s 
vote (coded 1 if pro-plaintiff and 0 if pro-employer). 19  Our central independent variables 
of interest are a judge’s sex (1= female, 0 = male) and the law school graduation year.  
Because we argue that the effect of gender is contingent upon when a judge attended law 
school, we create an interaction term between judge sex and law school graduation 
year.20   
We begin by looking at the gender composition of the student population enrolled 
in law schools beginning in 1947 (the first year for which aggregate data are available), 
shown in Figure 1. The law school enrollment data point to a distinctive shift that took 
place in the decade of the 1970s.  In 1950, the percentage of women enrolled in law 
school was 3 percent, and the figure rose only slightly to 3.4 by 1960.  However, the 
percentage of women enrolled in law school rose from 8.6 in 1970 to 34 percent in 1980.  
                                                        
19 According to Sunstein et al. (2006: 159), the directionality of the cases is coded as 
liberal (1) if the plaintiff was afforded any relief and conservative (0) if the defendant 
won.  Epstein et al. (2013: 202) recoded cases in which the plaintiff was a man claiming 
sex discrimination to “other” (rather than as “liberal” or “conservative”). These cases are 
not included in our analysis, so that all the plaintiffs in our study are women.  
20 Existing scholarship on gender differences in attitudes between and among men and 
women in the mass public has used an individual’s birth year to determine cohort 
assignment (Sapiro 1980; Ciabattari 2001).  We opted against using this 
operationalization for our main analysis, given that our argument focuses on the 
experiences and socialization of individuals in law school and immediately afterward in 
the workforce.  
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Similarly, the average of the percent change from the previous year was less than half a 
percentage point in the 1960s, but 2.5 percent during the decade of the 1970s.21  
We also account for other factors that influence judicial voting.  The most 
important competing explanation for liberal voting in sex discrimination is a judge’s 
ideological predisposition, which has been shown to have consistent effects on judicial 
voting in the Courts of Appeals (Zorn & Bowie 2010; Sunstein et al. 2006).  We utilize 
the Judicial Common Space scores (Epstein et al. 2007; Giles et al. 2001), continuous 
measures of ideology that range from -1 (most liberal) to +1 (most conservative).  The 
JCS measure is used to estimate individual judge preferences, as well as circuit 
preferences (median circuit JCS score).  Following Epstein et al. (2013), we also control 
for the policy preferences of the panel by including two dummy variables that indicate 
whether the other two judges were both Democratic appointees (1 = yes, 0 = no), or both 
Republican appointees (1 = yes, 0 = no).  (The excluded category is a panel with one 
Democrat and one Republican.)  Because standards of appellate review encourage 
deference to the district court, another variable accounts for the ideological direction of 
the district court decision (1= liberal, 0 = conservative).  In addition to including fixed 
effects for circuit and year, we estimate models with robust standard errors clustered on 
judges.   
 
                                                        
21 The most recent year in which a female judge in our sample completed law school was 
1992, so we are unable to evaluate the voting behavior of a sufficient number of female 




 Table 2 presents the results from a logit model that estimates the likelihood that a 
judge will cast a pro-plaintiff vote in a sex discrimination case.22 The control variables 
perform largely as predicted.  Judicial policy preferences are partially driving voting 
behavior in sex discrimination cases; the variable for judicial ideology is correctly signed 
and significant at the .001 level. While being seated with two Democratic appointees is 
positively related to casting a liberal vote relative to voting by judges on “mixed” panels, 
being seated with two Republicans does not have a statistically significant effect.  If the 
district court found in favor of the plaintiff, as expected, a judge is more likely to cast a 
pro-plaintiff vote, too.  The control for circuit ideology fails to reach statistical 
significance.   
 Turning now to the interaction between judge sex and JD year, the coefficient 
does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance. However, because the 
coefficients and standard errors on an interaction term in a logit model are not directly 
interpretable, we must assess the statistical and substantive significance of the judge sex-
law school year interaction by graphing the marginal effects at quantities of interest 
(Brambor et al. 2006).  In Figure 2, we graph the marginal effect of being female 
conditioned by the law school graduation year, holding continuous variables at their 
medians and dichotomous variables at their modal values.  Because there are very few 
observations in our data from women who attended law school in the 1940s and 1950s, 
                                                        
22 In the appendix, we present results from a logit model that replicates the finding of 
Boyd et al. (2010), showing that female judges, on average, are more likely to cast a 
liberal vote in sex discrimination cases than male judges.  
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we utilize 90 percent confidence intervals in our graph, though similar results obtain 
when 95 percent confidence intervals are used.23  The resulting plot shows strong support 
for our argument about the important effects of socialization into the legal profession on 
gendered judicial decision making in sex discrimination cases.   
[Figure 2 about here] 
 First, as Figure 2 shows, the marginal effect of being female is highest in the 
earliest cohorts and declines steadily with more recent JD cohorts.  This decline is more a 
function of the sizeable drop in female judges’ pro-plaintiff voting (a .12 drop between a 
1943 graduate and a 1991 graduate) than changes in male judges’ voting, which is 
relatively flat (only a .02 change over the entire time period).  Second, the difference 
between men and women is only statistically significant during a twenty-one year 
window:  law school classes of 1954 through 1975.24 And while we can only speculate 
why the effect becomes insignificant after 1975, the law school enrollment numbers may 
shed some light, particularly if we focus on the rate of growth from year-to-year, rather 
than just the percentage of enrolled students who were female (see Figure 3).  According 
to the ABA data, during the 1947-2011 period, 1974 was the year with the single largest 
                                                        
23 When 95 percent confidence intervals are used, significant differences between men 
and women are seen from 1961 to 1972.    
24 Interestingly, Unger et al. (2010: 447) quote a prominent female psychologist who also 
identifies this period as an important one for her professionally:  “If anyone believes that 
I credit [the women’s movement] too much for changes in my own life, I have only this 
reply:  I know that I did not become a significantly better social psychologist between 
1969 and 1972, but I surely was treated as a better social psychologist.” 
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year-to-year increase (4.1 percent) in the percent of law students who were female.  After 
this peak, the rate of growth in women’s enrollment experienced a steady decline from 
1975 onward.25  
[Figure 3 about here] 
As a robustness test, we also re-estimated the model without the interaction term, 
instead conceptualizing a clear delineation point at which the socialization dynamics 
changed.  We selected 1975 as the cut-off year for several reasons.  First, as discussed 
above, 1974 was a record year for the growth in women’s law school enrollment and 
growth slowed beginning in 1975 (though women’s enrollment did continue to increase 
until around 2000).  By this time, Title VII had been in place for a decade and had been 
reinforced by additional federal legislation in 1972. Additionally, surveys show that, at 
this point, men and women’s attitudes about working women no longer diverge (Simon & 
Landis 1989) and that a majority of Americans had shifted their views of the women’s 
movement to be more favorable than unfavorable (Huddy et al. 2000).  
For this analysis, we created a series of dummy variables indicating whether the 
judge was a female who graduated law school before 1975, a female who graduated in 
1975 or later, a male who graduated before 1975, or a male who graduated in 1975 or 
later.  The results, shown in the Appendix, tell a similar story:  significant differences 
                                                        
25 We also estimated another model (not shown) in which we included a variable that 
measures the ABA’s reported percentage of women enrolled in law schools in that year.  
(The figure is aggregated over all law schools in a given year.) This indicator had very 
little variation in certain eras, particularly since the 1980s, and did not yield a statistically 
significant effect. 
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emerge between the earliest group of women (JD before 1975) and men of the same 
generation, but disappear when men and women who graduated in 1975 or later are 
compared with each other.26  There are no significant differences found between women 
who graduated before 1975 and women who graduated afterward.  Thus, it seems that 
gender differences in voting in sex discrimination cases are not static, but instead vary in 
ways that correspond to major changes in gendered socializing experiences in the legal 
profession and society. 
 
Discussion 
 Our analysis makes clear that recent scholarship finding differences between men 
and women judges in sex discrimination cases is being driven in part by the voting 
behavior of the cohort of trailblazer women.  While it may seem unsurprising that a group 
that includes President Carter’s nominees would be liberal in their voting patterns, it 
should be noted that this group also includes judges appointed by Reagan, George H.W. 
Bush, and Clinton.  (Indeed, in our data, 36 percent of the observations of women with 
law degrees before 1975 were Republican appointees.)  As Judges Hufstedler, a 
Democratic appointee, and Rovner, a Republican appointee, observed in the opening 
quotes, the experience of always being first was a challenging one – and formative for 
how these women would view the challenges faced by other women in the workplace.   
                                                        
26 When seated on a panel with one Democrat and one Republican, a female judge with a 
JD before 1975 has a .29 probability of a pro-plaintiff vote while a male judge from the 
same era has a .25 probability. (These probabilities are calculated with continuous 
variables held at their medians and dichotomous variables held at their modal values).  
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 Judges Hufstedler, Rovner and others in the first wave of female judges entered 
the legal profession during a period of immense change in attitudes about gender and 
opportunities for women.  From 1954 to 1975, the percentage of women enrolled in law 
school skyrocketed from just under 4 percent to nearly a quarter of all students. Before 
1965, employment discrimination against women was not banned by federal law, and 
even after the passage of Title VII, the implementation of its protections did not happen 
overnight, particularly in male-dominated professions like the law.  The shared sense of 
struggle among the trailblazer women bonded them together as law students (Ward 1994, 
980) and later when they blazed a new trail as federal judges.  Indeed, both Mary 
Schroeder and Dolores Sloviter told separate interviewers that the 10 women that Carter 
appointed to the U.S. Courts of Appeals always remained close, despite being scattered 
across the country (Haire & Moyer 2015, 105).27 
 Beyond this particular issue area, our findings have important implications for 
judicial selection.  Our results challenge the assumption held by many involved in the 
nomination and confirmation process that particular traits (gender, race, and ethnicity 
among others) predict future voting behavior consistent with stereotypes about empathy 
in which women judges are expected to support women in cases of sex discrimination or 
African Americans are more likely to support minorities in cases of race discrimination.  
                                                        
27 Women Trailblazers in the Law Project, Transcript of oral history of Mary Murphy 
Schroeder, pp. 79-80.  Women Trailblazers in the Law Project Oral Histories, Box 10, 
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, transcript of oral history of 
Dolores Korman Sloviter. Amelia Helen Boss interviewer, dates of interviews: June 26, 
August 18, 2006; April 13 and July 25, 2007, p. 98.  
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We find evidence that judicial empathy for a plaintiff who alleges discriminatory 
treatment is not borne from a trait, but instead appears to form from experiences with 
discrimination.  While we focus on first-hand personal experiences with sex 
discrimination and their connection to empathy, other recent work suggests that personal 
experiences in the context of parent-child relationships can change judicial behavior as 
well (Glynn & Sen 2015).  Both of these perspectives emphasize the role of personal 
experiences in affecting behavior in ways consistent with empathetic responses.  
 Can male judges be sensitized to the claims of sex discrimination plaintiffs?  
While we find no evidence that male judges from more recent cohorts were liberalized by 
their experiences attending law school with large numbers of women, the literature does 
show that men change their voting behavior when seated with women in discrimination 
cases (Boyd et al. 2010; Peresie 2005; Farhang & Wawro 2004).  Moreover, experimental 
research suggests that through empathetic induction, men are able to better take the 
perspective of female criminal defendants (Plumm & Terrance 2009:  202-203). Taken 
together with our findings, we think this suggests that male judges can be made aware of 
the realities of discrimination through working closely with female colleagues, 
particularly those whose own perspective on discrimination comes from their personal 
experiences.  Future research should explore whether the addition of new judges who 
attended law school during the post-2000 era (when men and women’s enrollment were 
close to parity) is connected to other behavioral or attitudinal impacts that can be traced 
back to that formative experience.  
 Although scholars generally theorize that the effect of gender on judicial decision 
making operates differently than the effect of race, our findings suggest that, in the 
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context of judging civil rights claims, there may be similar causal mechanisms at 
work.  The oral histories of women judges emphasize that trailblazers personally 
contended with gender inequality in law school (and society) and hinted at how this 
shapes their views on the bench.  Here, we argue that it is this sense of shared struggle 
with discrimination that accounts for their response to plaintiffs when evaluating their 
claims.   This is similar to the account advanced to explain why African Americans, 
including judges, are more likely to support the claims of minorities in affirmative action 
cases and Voting Rights Act cases (Kastellec 2013; Cox & Miles 2009; Cox & Miles 
2008). Oral histories, public opinion scholarship and biographical accounts emphasize 
that more recent African Americans—including legislators and judges—continue to feel a 
strong sense of shared fate that fosters a perspective where a black judge can empathize 
with a plaintiff who has faced potentially similar circumstances (Haire & Moyer 
2015).  Moreover, as with sex discrimination cases (Boyd et al. 2010), African-American 
judges appear to be able to change the voting behavior of white colleagues on a panel so 
that they are more supportive of the position of the minority (Kastellec 2013).   
These findings underscore the importance of scholars continuing to investigate the 
role that empathy may play in judging, including its role in shaping interactions on 
appellate panels.  Informed by literature that identifies both trait and situational empathy 
(Plumm & Terrance 2009), the results from our study are consistent with the 
interpretation that empathy is not triggered simply by a demographic trait, but may be 
better conceptualized as having been primed by one’s life experiences and induced 
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Table 1:  Female Judges in the U.S. Courts of Appeals 






Nominating president,  
Year Appointed (Circuit) 
Florence Allen^ 1884 1914 FDR, 1934 (6th Cir.) 
Phyllis Kravitch  1920 1943 
Carter, 1979 (5th Cir.) 
Carter, 1981 (11th Cir.) 
Cornelia Kennedy 1923 1947 Carter, 1979  (6th Cir.) 
Betty Fletcher  1923 1956 Carter, 1979 (9th Cir.) 
Shirley Hufstedler^  1925 1949 Johnson, 1968 (9th Cir.) 
Dorothy Nelson  1928 1953 Carter, 1979 (9th Cir.) 
Patricia Wald  1928 1951 Carter, 1979 (D.C. Cir.) 
Cynthia Hall  1929 1954 Reagan, 1984 (9th Cir.) 
Dolores Sloviter  1932 1956 Carter, 1979 (3rd Cir.) 
Ruth Ginsburg^  1933 1959 Carter, 1980 (D.C. Cir.) 
Diana Murphy  1934 1974 Clinton, 1994 (8th Cir.) 
Jane Roth  1935 1965 GHW Bush, 1991 (3rd Cir.) 
Amalya Kearse*  1937 1962 Carter, 1979 (2nd Cir.) 
Maryanne Barry  1937 1974 Clinton, 1999 (3rd Cir.) 
Rosemary Pooler  1938 1965 Clinton, 1998 (2nd Cir.) 
Carolyn King^  1938 1962 Carter, 1979 (5th Cir.) 
Ilana Rovner 1938 1966 GHW Bush, 1992 (7th Cir.) 
Rosemary Barkett  1939 1970 Clinton, 1994 (11th Cir.) 
Judith Rogers*  1939 1969 Clinton, 1994 (D.C. Cir.) 
Mary Schroeder  1940 1965 Carter, 1979 (9th Cir.) 
Stephanie Seymour  1940 1965 Carter, 1979 (10th Cir.) 
Pamela Rymer  1941 1964 GHW Bush, 1989 (9th Cir.) 
Carol Mansmann 1942 1967 Reagan, 1985 (3rd Cir.) 
Martha Daughtrey  1942 1968 Clinton, 1993 (6th Cir.) 
Diana Motz  1943 1968 Clinton, 1994 (4th Cir.) 
Susan Black  1943 1967 GHW Bush, 1992 (11th Cir.) 
Alice Batchelder  1944 1971 GHW Bush, 1991 (6th Cir.) 
Karen Henderson  1944 1969 GHW Bush, 1990 (D.C. Cir.) 
Marsha Berzon  1945 1973 Clinton, 2000 (9th Cir.) 
Sandra Lynch  1946 1971 Clinton, 1995 (1st Cir.) 
Deannell Tacha  1946 1971 Reagan, 1985 (10th Cir.) 
Marjorie Rendell  1947 1973 Clinton, 1997 (3rd Cir.) 
Mary Briscoe  1947 1973 Clinton, 1995 (10th Cir.) 
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Edith Clement  1948 1972 GW Bush, 2001 (5th Cir.) 
Karen Moore  1948 1973 Clinton, 1995 (6th Cir.) 
Frank Hull  1948 1973 Clinton, 1997 (11th Cir.) 
Edith Jones  1949 1974 Reagan, 1985 (5th Cir.) 
Ann Williams*  1949 1975 Clinton, 1999 (7th Cir.) 
Susan Graber 1949 1972 Clinton, 1997 (9th Cir.) 
Janice Brown*  1949 1977 GW Bush, 2005 (D.C. Cir.) 
Julia Gibbons  1950 1975 GW Bush, 2002 (6th Cir.) 
Diane Wood 1950 1975 Clinton, 1995 (7th Cir.) 
Consuelo Callahan*  1950 1975 GW Bush, 2003 (9th Cir.) 
Reena Raggi 1951 1976 GW Bush, 2002 (2nd Cir.) 
Karen Williams 1951 1980 GHW Bush, 1992 (4th Cir.) 
Allyson Duncan* 1951 1975 GW Bush, 2003 (4th Cir.) 
Margaret McKeown  1951 1975 Clinton, 1998 (9th Cir.) 
Deborah Cook  1952 1978 GW Bush, 2003 (6th Cir.) 
Johnnie Rawlinson*  1952 1979 Clinton, 2000 (9th Cir.) 
Sonia Sotomayor*  1954 1979 Clinton, 1998 (2nd Cir.) 
Priscilla Owen  1954 1977 GW Bush, 2005 (5th Cir.) 
Helene White  1954 1978 GW Bush, 2008 (6th Cir.) 
Kim Wardlaw*  1954 1979 Clinton, 1998 (9th Cir.) 
Sandra Ikuta  1954 1988 GW Bush, 2006 (9th Cir.) 
Susan Neilson^  1956 1980 GW Bush, 2005 (6th Cir.) 
Diane Sykes 1957 1984 GW Bush, 2004 (7th Cir.) 
Debra Livingston^  1959 1984 GW Bush, 2007 (2nd Cir.) 
Catharina Haynes  1963 1986 GW Bush, 2008 (5th Cir.) 
Jennifer Elrod^  1966 1992 GW Bush, 2007 (5th Cir.) 
Notes:  * = judge is either African-American or Latina.   ^ = judge did not decide any sex 
discrimination cases included in the dataset. The nominating president refers to the 








Table 2:  Logit Model of Pro-Plaintiff Voting in Sex Discrimination Cases 








JD year -.004 
(.006) 






Seated with DD .398** 
(.186) 
Seated with RR -.180 
(.115) 
Liberal lower court  1.10** 
(.132) 






































Eleventh Circuit .029 
(.275) 







Notes:  **p < .05 (two-tailed). Robust errors are clustered on the judge. Controls for year 
omitted for space.  All models are significant at p <.001. The First Circuit is the excluded 









Notes:  The plot shows 90% confidence intervals around the marginal effect. When the 
confidence intervals include 0 (as shown by the solid horizontal line), then there is no 







Appendix: Supplemental Analyses of Law School Cohorts 
Logit models of the likelihood of a pro-plaintiff vote in sex discrimination cases 
U.S. Courts of Appeals (1995-2008) 



















-- -- -- -- 
Female—JD 
before 1975 
-- -- .033    
(.285) 
.301*    
(.175) 
.176    
(.317) 
Female—JD 
1975 or later 
-- -.033    
(.285) 
-- .267    
(.253) 




-- -.301*    
(.175) 
-.267    
(.253) 




-- -.209    
(.253) 
-.176    
(.317) 







-.657**    
(.142) 
-.657**    
(.142) 
-.657**    
(.142) 
-.657**    
(.142) 
Seated with DD .401** 
(.185) 
.398**    
(.186) 
.398**    
(.186) 
.398**    
(.186) 
.398**    
(.186) 
Seated with RR -.174 
(.115) 
-.175    
(.115) 
-.175    
(.115) 
-.175    
(.115) 






1.10**     
(.132) 
1.10**     
(.132) 
1.10**     
(.132) 
1.10**     
(.132) 
Circuit ideology .789 
(.652) 
.785    
(.653) 
.785    
(.653) 
.785    
(.653) 






1.14**    
(.436) 
1.14**    
(.436) 
1.14**    
(.436) 






1.39**    
(.342) 
1.39**    
(.342) 
1.39**    
(.342) 






.671**    
(.285) 
.671**    
(.285) 
.671**    
(.285) 






-.346    
(.228) 
-.346    
(.228) 
-.346    
(.228) 






.487    
(.273) 
.487    
(.273) 
.487    
(.273) 






-.027    
(.202) 
-.027    
(.202) 
-.027    
(.202) 






-.264    
(.194) 
-.264    
(.194) 
-.264    
(.194) 






.831    
(.401) 
.831    
(.401) 
.831    
(.401) 






-.120    
(.263) 
-.120    
(.263) 
-.120    
(.263) 






.012    
(.283) 
.012    
(.283) 
.012    
(.283) 
.012    
(.283) 
 44 
DC Circuit .744 
(.388) 
.737    
(.393) 
.737    
(.393) 
.737    
(.393) 




-1.46**    
(.397) 
-1.46**    
(.397) 
-1.46**    
(.397) 
-1.46**    
(.397) 
N 1694 1694 1694 1694 1694 
 
Notes: ** p < .05 (two-tailed test). * p < .05 (one-tailed test). Robust errors are clustered 
on the judge.  Controls for year omitted for space.  All models are significant at p < .001. 
In Model 2, the excluded category is women who graduated law school before 1975. In 
Model 3, it is women who graduated law school in 1975 or later. In Model 4, it is men 
who graduated before 1975, and in Model 5, it is men who graduated in 1975 or later. In 
all models, the First Circuit is the excluded reference category. 
 
